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Introduction
The consumption-saving choices of economic agents are driven by intertemporal utility trade-o®s between current and future consumption. Any intertemporal decision making process can be broken down into basically two components: First, the rate of time preference, i.e., how much importance agents give to the future, and second, the rate of return on savings, i.e., the reward for foregoing current consumption. Economic theory predicts that individuals who give more importance to future would defer consumption of a larger portion their current income to future. The consumption foregone can be utilized for investment in a productive activity which would increase consumption possibilities in the future.
Solow's ( [12] ) neo-classical model of growth, which is also the benchmark model for analyzing growth related issues focuses on the second aspect of this economic decision making process. According to the neo-classical model, when an economy is poor, that is, it has very little capital to work with, the rate of return on investment is very high. This induces people to save and invest more, and the economy embarks on the process of growth and development. As societies accumulate more capital the return on investment declines and hence people become less thrifty. The process of accumulation of capital goes on until the society reaches its desired level of capital and output.
An important implication of the neo-classical model is that poorer economies would grow at a more rapid rate than richer economies provided they have access to the same technology. In long run, all economies converge to the same level of capital and output. The initial conditions of an economy do not play any role in determining the long-run level of a²uence of an economy.
This implication of the neo-classical model is commonly referred to as the convergence hypothesis. Subsequent empirical studies have failed to vindicate the convergence hypothesis, however, there is evidence of convergence among the OECD countries. This phenomenon called club convergence implies that rates of growth rates of economies with similar levels of a²uence will tend to converge.
One of the common features of most models of growth is that all individuals give the same amount of importance to the future and that weight is assumed to be an exogenously given parameter called subjective discount factor. Usually it is assumed that the discount factor is less than one, implying that people give less importance to future consumption in comparison to current consumption. One possible economic rationale behind this assumption may be that there is a chance that an agent may not survive to the future period to reap the bene¯ts of his current savings. However, assuming the discount factor to be same for all agents requires some careful analysis. Treating the discount factor as an exogenously given parameter, makes the preferences of agents seperable over time and hence greatly simpli¯es the analysis of their optimal consumption-savings decisions. This technical simplicity comes at a cost of economic plausibility. Uzawa( [13] ) and Koopmans([7] )¯rst introduced the possibility of discount factors to be determined endogenously by allowing the preferences of agents to be recursive.
Their approach was extended and studied in greater detail by Epstein([4] ), Iwai([6] ) and Obstfeld([10] ). Both Epstein and Obstfeld assumed the dis-count factor of agents to be decreasing in the level of consumption. This behavioral assumption regarding the discount factors basically implies that agents become more impatient as they grow richer and their level of consumption rises. While they acknowledge that there may be equally compelling reasons to believe that people become more patient as they grow richer, they work with this behavior of discount rates as it ensures a unique steady state which is also stable. They conclude that the long-run level of consumption and output of an economy is unique and independent of the initial conditions, a result very similar to the neo-classical model.
In this paper, we interpret the discount rate as the probability of an agent surviving to the next period. We allow this probability of survival to be determined endogenously. The probability of survival is increasing as the agents current level of consumption increases. Hence, the importance given to the future is in°uenced by his endowment of wealth and other productive factors. We draw this relationship from the vast literature in development economics which have recorded the e®ect of malnutrition and undernourishment on the economic behavior of individuals. Individuals who cannot a®ord certain subsistence level of consumption are trapped in poverty and save very little. On the other hand, there is another section of population called the \middle class" which have recorded signi¯cant improvements in their real income in the development experience of countries like India. We attempt to explain these by studying the e®ect of initial endowment of wealth on the saving investment choice of individuals when the rate of time preference is allowed to vary.
At this point we would like to point out that the basic di®erence of our paper from rest of the literature. In our model, an individual's probability of surviving to a future period is increasing with his current level of consumption. This has the e®ect of decreasing the rate of time preference as current consumption of an individual rises. This assumption is not only has a certain economic rationale, it also has been found to be true in empirical studies. Ogaki and Atkeson( [11] ) in their study of panel data on three village districts in India,¯nd that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution rises with the level of wealth. The rate of time preference is not allowed to di®er according to their model. Lawrance([8] ) in her study on inter-temporal preferences based on U.S. panel data¯nds that subjective rate of time preference is about three to¯ve percentage points higher for households with lower incomes than those with higher incomes. Controlling for race and education widens this di®erence even more. These results suggest one possible explanation for the observed heterogeneity in savings behavior across socioeconomic classes within a society as well as across di®erent societies with di®erent levels of a²uence. This kind of behavior also has signi¯cant policy implications. Higher rates of time preference may reduce investment in education and thereby induce a negative relation between time preference and long-run income. Also, poor households will give less importance to the future and have a higher marginal propensity to consume which would adversely a®ect their savings-investment behavior.
A similar theoretical approach as ours was taken by Mantel([9] ), where he studies the impact of decreasing rate of time preference on the optimal growth path of an economy. However, Mantel's primary focus was to study the monotonocity properties of optimal consumption and investment paths.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our model and presents our basic results. Results concerning the steady states are presented in section 3. In section 4 we study the stability properties of the steady states. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and we conclude in section 6 with some possible research questions.
The Model
Consider a closed economy in a one-good world. The good can be used for either consumption or investment. The production of this good requires two kinds of inputs, labor(N) and capital(K ). There are a large number of competetive¯rms having the same constant returns to scale production technology. The aggregate production function of the economy in every period is described by
Our economy consists of a representative agent who seeks to maximize his lifetime welfare. The agent derives his income from selling productive factors in every period. The agent's endowment of labor is assumed to be constant in every period. However, the capital can change over time depending on the savings decision of the agent. The agent, given the initial endowment of capital, has to decide his consumption and savings.
At any period t there is a chance that the agent will not survive to the next period t + 1. The agent's probability of surviving to the next period depends on his current period consumption. If the agent's current period consumption is below a certain subsistence level of consumption(C), then the agent's probability of survival is extremely low(¯). As the consumption increases from this subsistence level the probability of survival also increases until consumption rises to a level of basic comfort(C ), where the agents probability of survival reaches a maximum(¯) and becomes insensitive to the changes in consumption. Thus, the probability of survival(½ t;t+1 ) from any period t to period t + 1 is a continuous function of consumption at time t in the following way:
Suppose the agent has to choose a path of consumption and savings at period 0 to maximize his lifetime welfare. The weight given to future consumption will depend on the agent's probability of surviving to that future date. Let the probability of surviving to period t be denoted by ½ 0;t . These probabilities are the discount factors of the agent in his intertemporal maximization problem. Let us take note of some properties of the discount factors ½ 0;t which will help in simplifying our analysis in future.
(P1) ½ 0;0 = 1, ½ 0;t =¯(C 0 )¯(C 1 ):::::::::
The maximization problem faced by the agent is
subject to
and a transversality condition
The agent's period utility function is U(C t ) and ± is the depreciation rate of capital where, 0 < ± < 1. At this point we make some assumptions concerning the functions U(:) and¯(:) to ensure that the necessary conditions for maximum are also su±cient.
The Lagrangian for the agent's problem can be written as
The¯rst-order conditions for maximum are
and the transversality condition holding with equality. Let
, where Á t+1 is the present discounted value of future consumption from period t + 1 onwards. The¯rst order conditions can now be re-written as
and
Note that U 00 (C t ) +¯0 0 (C t ) Á t+1 < 0 since the functions U(:) and¯(:) are concave. Thus the second order condition for maximum is also satis¯ed.
Substituting (3) in (4) we get,
Notice that the variable Á t , the present discounted value of utilities from period t onwards, evolves in the following fashion:
De¯nition 1 A perfect foresight equilibrium(PFE) of this econmomy are sequences fC t g 1 t=0 ; fK t+1 g 1 t=0 ; fÁ t g 1 t=1 such that (5), (6) , (7) and TC hold for a given K 0 .
Equation (5) is the intertemporal budget constraint of the agent. Equation (6) which is derived from (3) and (4) tells us that the loss in welfare due to foregoing consumption in period t has to equal the discounted value of gain in welfare from period t + 1 onwards. This condition is commonly referred to as the Fisher equation.
Steady-state Equilibria
Let us¯rst study the steady state solutions to the di®erence equations (5), (6), (7) . In a steady state
for all t. In a steady state, equations (5) and (6) reduce to
and¯(
Equation (RR) is the steady state counterpart of the Fisher's intertemporal optimum. Equation (BC) gives us the locus of points along which the agent's consumption and capital stock are constant and satisfy the budget constraint.
We are going to restrict our attention to only the positively sloped part of the BC curve 1 . The slope of RR curve in consumption-capital plane is given 1 The slope of BC curve is F K (K; N )¡ ± . This slope is positive for low values of capital and becomes negative after capital increases beyond the point where
According to RR in a steady state
which is a contradiction since [¯(C )] ¡1 is always greater than one.
by
which is always positive from our assumptions. We will soon derive the conditions for the existence of a steady state equilibrium. However, assuming those conditions hold, plotting BC and RR curves on consumptioncapital plane shows that there could be multiple steady state solutions to the agent's problem(see Figure 1) . 
Proof: See the appendix.
The result follows from the steady state equation (RR) and says that the possible steady state capital levels are bounded within an interval which is determined by the minimum and maximum value of the discount factors.
However between these bounds there may be more than one steady state equilibrium. The next proposition characterizes the number and type of such equilibria.
Proposition 1
If the subsistence level of consumption(C ) is equal to zero, then the steady state level of capital is strictly greater than K . There exists at least one steady state of type \H". If there exists \n" steady states of type \H", then there must be \(n-1)" steady states of type \L".
The following lemma establishes a su±cient condition for the existence of at least one steady state of type \L".
Lemma 2 Let C = 0 and F K (K ; N) > ± and K 1 denote the lowest steady state level of capital. If there exists a
then there exists at least one steady state of type \L" and two steady states of type \H".
In the subsequent analysis we are going to assume the requirement of lemma 2 is satis¯ed and the economy has two steady states of type \H"
with an intermediate steady state of type \L". All the intresting qualitative properties of the model can be studied within such a setup. We¯rst study the local stability properties of the steady states.
Local equlibria
The stability of the steady states will depend on the behavior of the C , K , and ¢ 2 is a weighted average of the elasticity of the period utility function and the discount factor at the steady state. Details of the derivation of equation (8) Proposition 2 Any steady state of type \H" is a saddle path and locally unique. Any steady state of type \L" is locally unstable.
If an economy is endowed with a level of capital stock close to a steady state capital of type \H" then the economy will converge to that steady state level of capital. Howver the steady states of type \L" are unstable. So far we have asumed that the agent is prefectly informed about the e®ect of his current consumption on his probability of survival. However, the results will not change he fails to internalize this e®ect.
Proposition 3
If the agent fails to internalize the e®ect of consumption on the probability of survival, the possible steady state equilibria to the agent's optimization problem and their local stability properties are una®ected.
Long run output and Poverty traps
Depending on the initial level of capital, the economy might have three possible steady states. The pair (K p ; C p ) denotes a situation like poverty trap.
One the other hand the pair (K h ; C h ) is the high level equilibrium. Both these steady states are locally stable and unique. The pair (K u ; C u ) is the unstable steady state(see Figure 2 ). This kind of behavior is very similar to would result in the possibility of two distinct growth rates in our model also.
A detailed discussion of that scenario falls beyond the scope of the present essay.
In our model the causes of an economy falling into a poverty trap are slightly di®erent. If an individual is extremely poor, then he gives less weight to future and hence his saving and investment behavior is adversely e®ected.
The economy may be stuck at a low-level equilibrium as a result of perfectly rational intertemporal decision process. This kind of behavior is called investment in patience by Becker and Mulligan( [2] ).
The population and hence the labor force is assumed to be constant in follows that there must be one steady state of type \L" between two steady states of type \H".
Proof of Lemma 2:
The existence of a type \H"steady state capital like K 1 follows from Propo-
) < F (K 0 ; N) ¡ ±K 0 then there is some value of capital for which the RR curve is below the BC curve. Thus there is a steady state of type \L". The assumption of F K (K ; N) > ± then guarantees the existence of the second steady state of type \H".
Derivation of Equation 8:
Log-linearization of (5) around a steady state yields
where`^' denotes percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state value and s 1 = ¡C=K at steady state. From (3), we have
where
and s 3 = 1 ¡ s 2 . We write the above equation more compactly as
From (4) we have
! < 0, and
From (7) we get
We can now use equations (I)-(V) to write a system of di®erence equations in b C t , b Á t and c K t where the dynamical system can be expressed as Now using the fact that at steady state
Therefore, we can write
, and
. Now consider the one kind of steady state SS H : In SS H the slope of the RR curve is greater than the slope of the BC curve. That is
Conversely in the other kind of steady state
exist then they must be positive.
Therefore around SS H there exists one eigenroot ¹ 3 which is less than one in absolute value. It is easy to show that the eigenroot ¹ 2 will be greater than one. Hence, SS H is a saddle path and the system is locally unique around the steady state. For the second part of the lemma, we split up the analysis of the roots into various cases. Firstly, we note that
Case 1(Imaginary roots). The polynomial P (¹) will have imaginary roots if
The modulus of the imaginary roots will be p¯¡ 1 > 1.
Case 2. (Real and distinct roots) The polynomial P (¹) will have real and Hence the roots will be greater than 1.
So SS L is a source and the system is locally unstable.
Proof of Proposition 3:
If the agent does not take into account the e®ect of current consumption on the probability of survival then the¯rst order conditions for an optimum would have to satisfy So steady states of type \H" are locally stable and steady states of type \L" are unstable.
Proof of Proposition 4:
From Lemma 1, we know that the steady state capital stock can never be less than K. The (RR) curve is a vertical line until the subsistence level of consumption is reached. If C > F (K; N ) ¡ ±K , it imples that the (RR) curve will intersect the (BC) curve at C = F (K; N ) ¡ ±K and hence K = K, C = F (K ; N) ¡ ±K will be a steady state equilibrium. Log-linearization of the¯rst order conditions around steady state yields the following dynamical 
